The More Things Stay the Same, the More They Change: The Influence of Judge Harry Pregerson on Franchise Movement Policy In Professional Team Sports by Ruiz Cameron, Christopher David
Santa Clara Law Review 
Volume 61 Number 1 Article 9 
2-9-2021 
The More Things Stay the Same, the More They Change: The 
Influence of Judge Harry Pregerson on Franchise Movement 
Policy In Professional Team Sports 
Ruiz Cameron, Christopher David 
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.scu.edu/lawreview 
 Part of the Law Commons 
Recommended Citation 
Christopher David Ruiz Cameron, The More Things Stay the Same, the More They Change: The Influence 
of Judge Harry Pregerson on Franchise Movement Policy In Professional Team Sports, 61 SANTA CLARA 
L. REV. 283 (2020). 
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Journals at Santa Clara Law Digital Commons. It has 
been accepted for inclusion in Santa Clara Law Review by an authorized editor of Santa Clara Law Digital 




THE MORE THINGS STAY THE SAME, THE MORE 
THEY CHANGE: THE INFLUENCE OF JUDGE HARRY 
PREGERSON ON FRANCHISE MOVEMENT POLICY IN 
PROFESSIONAL TEAM SPORTS 
Christopher David Ruiz Cameron* 
For a guy who thought sports were fun, and liked to say, “Fun is 
bullshit,” Judge Harry Pregerson has had a significant impact on the 
application of antitrust law to major league team sports.  Harry’s land-
mark ruling forty years ago in Los Angeles Memorial Coliseum Com-
mission v. National Football League, which rejected the NFL’s single-
entity defense (“Single Entity Ruling”), helped improve the lives of oth-
ers.  The Single-Entity Ruling opened the door to significant franchise 
movement in professional teams sports, which in turn caused the big 
shots running major league sports to be more responsive to market 
forces in at least three ways.  First, the Single-Entity Ruling ushered in 
a new era of franchise movement, especially in the NFL.  Second, it ex-
posed to antitrust scrutiny a variety of anticompetitive practices other 
than franchise relocation policy.  Third, the Single-Entity Ruling helped 
spawn new forms of sports ownership that were designed, among other 
things, to evade antitrust scrutiny by looking more like genuine parts of 
a single business entity.  Harry’s ultimate vindication came almost thirty 
years later, in American Needle, Inc. v. National Football League, in 
which the Supreme Court,  without citing the Single-Entity Ruling by 
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The late Harry Pregerson didn’t even like football.  In fact, he 
wasn’t much of a fan of any sport, professional or amateur. 
Four decades ago, when I served as Harry’s law clerk, the Raiders 
were in the middle of a championship run.  It was their second season as 
the new tenants of the Los Angeles Memorial Coliseum.1  Their roster 
included future Hall of Famers Marcus Allen at running back, Ray Guy 
at punter, Mike Haynes at cornerback, and Howie Long at defensive 
end.2  Lyle Alzado, the other defensive end, was built and played like 
The Incredible Hulk; Todd Christensen, their tight end, went on to catch 
twelve touchdown passes that season; and Jim Plunkett, the durable 
quarterback who made those touchdown passes, threw what proved to 
be the game-winning touchdown to wide receiver Cliff Branch in Super 
Bowl XVIII (although Allen’s magnificent seventy-four-yard-touch-
down run to seal the victory is the play everyone remembers).3   
At the same time, the team was morphing into a worldwide brand: 
their “colors, swagger, and anti-establishment ethos” became linked with 
the hip-hop scene that started in South Central L.A. and spread through-
out the region.4  Rapper-turned-filmmaker Ice Cube, who wore a Raiders 
 
 1. Los Angeles Raiders Team History, SPORTS TEAM HIST., https://sportsteamhis-
tory.com/los-angeles-raiders (last visited Oct. 2, 2020). 
 2. See Raiders In the Pro Football Hall of Fame, LAS VEGAS RAIDERS, 
https://www.raiders.com/history/hall-of-fame (last visited Oct. 2, 2020). 
 3. See 1983 Los Angeles Raiders Statistics & Players, PRO FOOTBALL REFERENCE, 
https://www.pro-football-reference.com/teams/rai/1983.htm (last visited Oct. 2, 2020); Asso-
ciated Press, Allen’s 74-yard run in 1984 among Super Bowl’s best, NBC SPORTS (Feb. 4, 
2016), https://www.nbcsports.com/bayarea/raiders/allens-74-yard-run-1984-among-super-
bowls-best. 
 4. About Straight Outta L.A., ESPN, 
http://www.espn.com/30for30/film/_/page/straight-outta-la (last visited Oct. 2, 2020). 
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cap everywhere he went, helped make the silver and black culturally sig-
nificant and made the team the toast of Southern California, especially 
among Black and Latino fans.5  In the years that followed, a raft of Hol-
lywood-caliber celebrities pledged their allegiance to the team.  They 
included rapper M.C. Hammer, golf legend Tiger Woods, basketball 
icon Magic Johnson, and actor Tom Hanks.6  The region’s loyalty ran 
deep; Southern California remained part of the Raiders Nation even after 
the club had returned to the East Bay.  On the last day of the regular 
season in 2017, the Oakland Raiders visited the Los Angeles Chargers 
at the Stub Hub Center in Carson, California.7  It was the first game that 
they had played in the Los Angeles area since they left in 1994.8  But 
Raiders fans outnumbered Chargers fans in attendance by at least three 
to one.9  The game exposed a truth that the NFL had long refused to 
admit: even after breaking up with the city twenty-four years earlier, the 
Raiders were still L.A.’s favorite professional football team.10 
None of this impressed Harry. 
One day in chambers, I happened to mention that I had a ticket to 
watch the Raiders play the Broncos at the Coliseum.  I figured that the 
author of one of the most important antitrust cases affecting professional 
team sports would be interested in the fruits of his labor.  Instead, he 
asked me why I was going. 
I said, “Because it’ll be fun, Judge.” 
He replied, “Fun is bullshit.” 
Now, I should explain that this was Harry’s instant reaction to every 
type of diversion.  He liked to say, “Fun is bullshit,” “Happiness is bull-
shit,” and, “Vacations are bullshit.”  (I don’t recall his saying, “Sports 
are bullshit,” but it wouldn’t surprise me if he did.) 
That’s because Harry liked to work, and he always was working.  
He spent Saturdays puttering in his backyard and Sundays visiting the 
homeless shelters that he helped build.  He spent his weeknights working 
the telephones to get the support he needed to keep them going.  He spent 
his weekdays reviewing his caseload and editing drafts of opinions pre-
pared by law clerks.  He didn’t have time to watch sports on TV or, 
 
 5. See id. 
 6. See Richard Calhoun, 17 Famous Oakland Raiders Fans, FOX SPORTS (Oct. 26, 
2016, 4:50 PM), https://www.foxsports.com/nfl/gallery/17-famous-oakland-raiders-fans-
012815. 
 7. See Dieter Kurtenbach, Kurtenbach: The Raiders’ L.A. ‘home’ game exposed the 
NFL’s relocation mistakes, MERCURY NEWS (Dec. 31, 2017), https://www.mercuryn-
ews.com/2017/12/31/oakland-raiders-los-angeles-chargers-nfl-2017-relocation-las-vegas-
san-diego-stubhub-center-stadium-soccer-gruden/. 
 8. Id. 
 9. Id. 
 10. See id. 
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heaven forbid, attend the games.  His wife Bern complained that Harry 
wouldn’t even take her to watch California Bears football when he was 
attending law school at Berkeley and she was an undergraduate there.  
The only sporting events he went to in all the years I knew him were 
high school basketball games starring his grandson Bradley. 
What Harry meant by calling fun “bullshit” was that true enjoyment 
in life comes not from pursuing one’s selfish desires, but from helping 
other people.  And he enjoyed life immensely.  No federal judge in 
American history did more to help make other people’s lives better than 
Harry Pregerson did.  Both on and off the bench, where he served as a 
federal judge for fifty years, Harry Pregerson devoted all his energy to 
making other people’s lives better,11 even when his family might have 
preferred his spending more time relaxing with them. 
Which brings me to the Raiders Antitrust Litigation.  Harry’s land-
mark ruling in Los Angeles Memorial Coliseum Commission v. National 
Football League,12 which rejected the NFL’s single-entity defense (“Sin-
gle-Entity Ruling”), helped improve the lives of others—even if Judge 
Pregerson himself had doubts.13  The Single-Entity Ruling opened the 
door to significant franchise movement in professional teams sports, 
which in turn caused the big shots running major league sports to be 
more responsive to market forces.  They were forced to honor the de-
mands of fans in cities like Los Angeles who wanted their own teams, 
even when the owners of rival clubs resisted. 
To these ends, this Article proceeds in three parts.  Part I summa-
rizes the Raiders Antitrust Litigation, including the plans of club owner 
Al Davis to move the franchise from Oakland to Los Angeles.  Part II 
summarizes the Single-Entity Ruling and Harry’s rationale for it.  Part 
III explains the impact of the Single-Entity Ruling on franchise reloca-
tion in both the NFL and other professional team sports. 
 
 11. See Christopher David Ruiz Cameron, Harry Pregerson, the Real Mayor of Los An-
geles, 36 SW. U. L. REV. 311 (2007); Christopher David Ruiz Cameron, The Real Mayor of 
Los Angeles, L.A. Daily J., Dec. 1, 2017, at 8 [hereinafter Cameron, The Real Mayor of Los 
Angeles]. 
 12. L.A. Mem’l Coliseum Comm’n v. NFL, 519 F. Supp. 581 (C.D. Cal. 1981) (Preger-
son, J.) (sitting by designation), aff’d, 726 F.2d 1381 (9th Cir. 1984). 
 13. Harry once told me that the most important opinions he wrote concerned better 
schools for children; equal rights for women and minorities; dignity for veterans and immi-
grants; respect for gay people; food for the hungry and shelter for the homeless; and clean 
water, affordable housing, and better transportation for everyone. See Cameron, The Real 
Mayor of Los Angeles, supra note 11. His Single-Entity Ruling in the Raiders Antitrust Liti-
gation didn’t make the list. In fact, he rarely spoke about the case, and when he did, it was to 
talk about the lawyers’ performances, not the merits of the case, much less the exploits of the 
Raiders. 
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II. THE RAIDERS ANTITRUST LITIGATION 
A. The Raiders Decide to Leave Oakland for Los Angeles 
In the forty years before the 1980 regular season, when the Raiders 
announced their plan to move from Oakland to Los Angeles, the NFL14 
saw only five franchise relocations from one metropolitan area to an-
other.  These relocations included the Rams, who moved from Cleveland 
to Los Angeles in 1946; the Colts, who moved from Dallas to Baltimore 
in 1953 (and changed their name from the Texans); the Cardinals, who 
moved from Chicago to St. Louis in 1960; the Chargers, who moved 
from Los Angeles to San Diego in 1961; and the Chiefs, who moved 
from Dallas to Kansas City in 1963 (and also changed their name from 
the Texans).15 
Of the many reasons accounting for this relative lack of movement, 
the most significant was Article IV, Section 3 of the NFL’s Constitution 
and Bylaws (“Rule 4.3”), a rule that had been adopted by the club owners 
themselves.16  It banned any club from moving “its franchise or playing 
site to a different city” without the prior approval of three-fourths of the 
all the clubs in the league.17  Under Rule 4.3, Al Davis, the mercurial and 
 
 14. The term “NFL” as used in this Article refers to the combined franchises of both the 
old NFL and the old American Football League (AFL), a separate professional football league 
that merged into what is known collectively as the NFL. When the Chiefs moved to Kansas 
City and the Chargers moved to San Diego, they were both AFL franchises. Under the merger 
agreement, which was announced in 1966 and took effect in 1970, the two leagues became 
one league with two conferences. The history and records of the AFL were incorporated into 
the NFL, but the AFL’s name and logo were retired. See History.com Editors, NFL and AFL 
announce merger, HISTORY (June 5, 2020), https://www.history.com/this-day-in-history/nfl-
and-afl-announce-merger. 
 15. See Jeff Kerr, Las Vegas Raiders latest NFL franchise to change cities: Here’s a look 




e%20to%20St. Notes: The Patriots moved from Boston to Foxboro, Massachusetts, in 1971 
(and changed their name from the Boston Patriots to the New England Patriots) but remained 
in the Boston metropolitan area. See Team History, PRO FOOTBALL HALL OF FAME, 
https://www.profootballhof.com/teams/new-england-patriots/team-history/ (last visited Oct. 
3, 2020). The Rams moved from Los Angeles to Anaheim, California, in 1980, but remained 
in the Los Angeles metropolitan area. See Rams Sign Contracts With Anaheim, N.Y. TIMES 
(Nov. 22, 1978), https://www.nytimes.com/1978/11/22/archives/rams-sign-contracts-with-
anaheim-a-35year-lease-signed.html. 
 16. NAT’L FOOTBALL LEAGUE, CONSTITUTION AND BYLAWS § 4.3 (rev. ed. 2006). 
 17. Id. Originally, Rule 4.3 required the unanimous approval of the owners. In late 1978, 
with the relocation of the Rams from Los Angeles to Oakland on the horizon, the rule was 
amended to require the three-fourths approval of the owners. See L.A. Mem’l Coliseum 
Comm’n v. NFL, 726 F.2d 1381, 1385 (9th Cir. 1984). 
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outspoken owner of the Raiders,18 had to persuade at least twenty-one of 
his twenty-seven colleagues to vote in favor of moving the Raiders from 
Oakland to L.A.19  Davis, who was unhappy with the lack of progress in 
negotiations for a new or expanded venue at the Oakland Coliseum, 
never got the chance.  Against Davis’ wishes, the NFL clubs met and 
voted against him, twenty-two to zero, with five abstentions.20  Unde-
terred, Davis made plans to move anyway.  His plans happened to coin-
cide with a vacancy in what was then L.A.’s premier sports venue: the 
aging but still-venerable Los Angeles Memorial Coliseum.21 
The Coliseum, which had opened in 1923 and later hosted the 1932 
and 1984 Olympic Games, was located five miles south of City Hall.22  
For decades, it had served as the home field for three major football 
teams: the Los Angeles Rams, the UCLA Bruins, and the USC Trojans.  
In fact, the USC campus was right across the street.23  But in 1978, the 
NFL owners approved the Rams’ move to Angel Stadium in Anaheim, 
California, which was located thirty-five miles south in Orange 
County.24  The change would be effective for the 1980-81 season.25  It 
would be the first time that the Coliseum had lacked a professional foot-
ball tenant since 1946.26  (A few years later, the Bruins would move 
nineteen miles north to the Rose Bowl in Pasadena, California, leaving 
the Trojans as the only football tenant.27)  The Coliseum Commission, 
which operated the venue, responded by requesting that the NFL provide 
a new tenant.28  When a firm commitment to do so was not forthcoming, 
the Commission filed suit against the NFL and its member clubs on the 
theory that Rule 4.3 and related franchise movement rules violated the 
Sherman Act.29  The Raiders had not yet expressed a desire to move to 
 
 18. L.A. Mem’l Coliseum Comm’n, 726 F.2d at 1385; Jon Wertheim, How the Influence 
of Al Davis Shaped the Modern NFL, SPORTS ILLUSTRATED (Aug. 27, 2019), 
https://www.si.com/nfl/2019/08/27/al-davis-oakland-raiders-nfl-100-seasons. 
 19. L.A. Mem’l. Coliseum Com’n v. NFL, 791 F.2d 1356, 1385 (9th Cir. 1986). 
 20. L.A. Mem’l Coliseum Comm’n, 726 F.2d at 1385. 
 21. Id. 
 22. Coliseum History, L.A. COLISEUM, https://www.lacoliseum.com/coliseum-history/ 
(last visited Oct. 3, 2020); Driving Directions from LA Memorial Coliseum to Rosebowl 
Stadium, GOOGLE MAPS, https://www.google.com/maps. 
 23. Getting Here, L.A. COLISEUM, https://www.lacoliseum.com/directions/ (last visited 
Oct. 3, 2020); Coliseum History, supra note 22. 
 24. Rams Sign Contracts With Anaheim, supra note 15. 
 25. Id. 
 26. Coliseum History, supra note 22. 




 28. L.A. Mem’l Coliseum Comm’n v. NFL, 726 F.2d 1381, 1384-85 (9th Cir. 1984). 
 29. Id. at 1385. 
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L.A. or joined the Commission as plaintiffs, and were, therefore, named 
a defendant as a member club.30  Thereafter, the NFL filed a motion to 
dismiss the complaint for failure to state a claim upon which relief could 
be granted, and the plaintiffs filed a motion for partial summary judg-
ment to enjoin enforcement of the Rule 4.3.31 
In early 1979, Harry Pregerson, presiding as the District Court 
judge, granted the motion to dismiss the complaint, with leave to amend, 
but denied the motion to enjoin enforcement of Rule 4.3.32  The main 
reason was that the Commission had not proved its standing to sue.33  In 
particular, the complaint did not allege the reasonable likelihood that the 
NFL would injure the business of operating the Coliseum by refusing to 
approve the tenancy of either an expansion team or a relocated fran-
chise;34 up to that point, nobody had asked and no votes had been taken.  
And without a plaintiff having standing, plus a fully developed record, 
Harry could not determine whether the application of Rule 4.3 unreason-
ably violated the antitrust laws.35 
B. The Raiders Antitrust Litigation: A Story in Three Parts 
After studying Harry’s dismissal ruling, lawyers for the plaintiffs 
filed an amended complaint addressing his concerns.  But without an 
NFL franchise seeking to play in the Coliseum, the case languished for 
a year.  Then, in early 1980, Davis helped revive the suit by announcing 
his intention to move the Raiders’ home games to the Coliseum.36  With-
out being asked, the NFL clubs reacted by meeting and voting to reject 
the move.37  The many reasons for this resistance would no doubt fill a 
book, but one of the big ones seemed to lie in the personal animosity 
between Commissioner Pete Rozelle, the league’s long-serving chief ex-
ecutive, and Davis, its most outspoken owner-critic.38  Rozelle once de-
scribed Davis as an “outlaw” among NFL owners.39  In return, Davis 
claimed that the “real reason” why the NFL refused to grant permission 
to move was because Rozelle “wanted Los Angeles for himself.  He 
 
 30. Id.; L.A. Mem’l Coliseum Comm’n v. NFL, 468 F. Supp. 154 (C.D. Cal. 1979). 
 31. L.A. Mem’l Coliseum Comm’n, 468 F. Supp. at 154. 
 32. Id. at 156, 167-68. 
 33. Id. at 157-62. 
 34. Id. at 159. 
 35. Id. at 167-68. 
 36. L.A. Mem’l Coliseum Comm’n v. NFL, 726 F.2d 1381, 1385 (9th Cir. 1984). 
 37. Id. 
 38. See Ken Belson, Awkward Handoff of Lombardi Trophy Has Roots in Renegade 
Raiders, N.Y. TIMES (Feb. 3, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/2017/02/03/sports/football/su-
per-bowl-pete-rozelle-al-davis-roger-goodell-robert-kraft.html. 
 39. NFL, Davis Fail to Reach Settlement, FACTS ON FILE WORLD NEWS DIG., Feb. 6, 
1981, at 1, LEXIS Job No. 126282435. 
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finally said it was the best city in the country to have a team and he 
wasn’t about to let me have it.”40 
Thereafter, Rozelle notified the Raiders that the league would con-
tinue to schedule all their homes games in Oakland.41  So the Raiders 
switched sides and joined the Coliseum’s suit as co-plaintiffs,42 and Da-
vis signed an agreement with the Commission to permit the Raiders to 
play in their new venue as early as the 1980-81 season.43 
When repeated settlement efforts by Harry proved unsuccessful,44 
the Raiders Antitrust Litigation went to trial.  The liability proceeding 
was bifurcated from the damages phase, and the case proceeded in three 
parts: there was a first liability trial (“First Liability Trial”), which ended 
with a hung jury and the grant of a motion for a new trial; there was a 
second liability trial (“Second Liability Trial”), which ended with a ver-
dict and a judgment in favor of the Raiders and the Coliseum Commis-
sion; and there was a damages trial (“Damages Trial”), which resulted 
in a multi-million dollar verdict in favor of the plaintiffs.45 
1. First Liability Trial 
The First liability Trial, which lasted from May to July 1981,46 gen-
erated plenty of drama, perhaps due to the parties’ perceptions that the 
stakes were high. 
The proceedings, which each day began with the type of solemnity 
Harry preferred, were called to order by Dick Johnson, Harry’s longtime 
courtroom deputy.  Dick intoned: “In the presence of the flag of our 
 
 40. Rich Tosches, Raiders Win Antitrust Suit, UNITED PRESS INT’L, May 8, 1982, at 2, 
LEXIS Job No. 126282935. 
 41. Gary R. Roberts, The Evolving Confusion of Professional Sports Antitrust, the Rule 
of Reason, and the Doctrine of Ancillary Restraints, 61 S. CAL. L. REV. 943, 957 (1988). 
 42. See, e.g., id. 
 43. See, e.g., Raiders Agree to Play in L.A., FACTS ON FILE WORLD NEWS DIG., Mar. 7, 
1980, at 1, LEXIS Job No. 126283041. 
 44. The obvious settlement options were either to grant Los Angeles an expansion team 
and require the Raiders to remain in Oakland or to permit the Raiders to move to L.A. and 
grant Oakland an expansion team. The league resisted both options. See, e.g., Dave Brady, 
Court Plan: Move Raiders, Give Oakland New Franchise; Raider Proposal Unsupported, 
WASH. POST, Dec. 3, 1980, at E1, LEXIS Job No. 126283237; Byron Rosen, Judge Urges 
Raiders, NFL to Solve Dispute, WASH. POST, Jan. 20, 1981, at D3, LEXIS Job No. 
126283400; NFL, Davis Fail to Reach Settlement, supra note 39; see also, e.g., John F. Berry, 
Rozelle Denies ‘78 Deal With Davis on Transfer, WASH. POST, May 23, 1981, at D1, LEXIS 
Job No. 126283525. 
 45. L.A. Mem’l Coliseum Comm’n v. NFL, 726 F.2d 1381, 1385-86 (9th Cir. 1984). 
 46. L.A. Mem’l Coliseum Comm’n v. NFL, 519 F. Supp. 581, 581 (C.D. Cal. 1981) 
(Pregerson, J.) (sitting by designation), aff’d, 726 F.2d 1381 (9th Cir. 1984). 
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country and the Constitution for which it stands, this United States Dis-
trict Court is now in session.”47 
Then the drama began.  Early on, the NFL served subpoenas de-
manding that Melvin Durslag and Scot Paltrow, two reporters of the 
now-defunct Los Angeles Herald Examiner, a newspaper published by 
what was left of the Hearst empire, produce any notes, files, and record-
ings of conversations they might have had with confidential sources 
about the proposed transfer of the Raiders or the Rams to another city.48  
Citing the California journalists’ privilege, Harry issued an order quash-
ing the subpoenas.49 
When Harry informed prospective jurors that the trial could take 
three to four months, more drama ensued.  Of 130 potential jurors called 
to the courthouse on the first day of jury selection, fifty were excused 
after pleading hardships ranging from work schedules to vacations.  One 
man told Harry, “I have a prepaid vacation planned for September.50  If 
the trial lasted that long, I’d have to look for a new wife to take on a later 
vacation.”  Harry replied, “I think we may all have the same problem.”51 
Then the league, claiming that it would be prejudiced by what it 
called massive pretrial publicity, filed a motion to transfer venue from 
the Central District of California to another, unspecific district outside 
the seven-county metropolitan area surrounding L.A.52  Harry knew the 
district occupied a land mass the size of Delaware and Rhode Island 
combined, and counted some 10 million residents, so he observed: 
“[T]he court can easily imagine that many persons in the district have no 
interest in either professional sports or football.”53  He knew this because 
he was one of them.  He issued an order denying the venue transfer re-
quest.54 
As for everyone else, he reasoned that careful voir dire, which 
would be accompanied by detailed questionnaires put to everyone in the 
jury pool, could be used to screen out biased jurors.55  Later, Harry 
 
 47. Email from Jeff Birren, former General Counsel, Raiders, to Christopher David Ruiz 
Cameron (May 4, 2020) (on file with author) (recollection of former Raiders General Counsel 
Jeffrey Birren). 
 48. L.A. Mem’l Coliseum Comm’n v. NFL, 89 F.R.D. 489, 490-92 (C.D. Cal. 1981); 
The Last Los Angeles Herald-Examiner Strike, CSUN U. LIBR. (Feb. 3, 2014), https://li-
brary.csun.edu/SCA/Peek-in-the-Stacks/Examiner. 
 49. See L.A. Mem’l Coliseum Comm’n, 89 F.R.D. at 496. 
 50. Rich Tosches, Raiders-NFL Trial Gets Underway, UNITED PRESS INT’L, May 11, 
1981, LEXIS Job No. 126282935. 
 51. Id. 
 52. L.A. Mem’l Coliseum Comm’n, 89 F.R.D. at 497. 
 53. Id. at 510. 
 54. Id. at 512. 
 55. Id. at 509 n.7. 
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confided to me that he wasn’t sure the NFL believed its own argument.  
When he offered to move the trial to Oxnard, a Central District farm 
town located over sixty miles from downtown L.A., Patrick Lynch, the 
NFL’s lead attorney, refused.  In any event, the venue transfer motion 
pushed back the scheduled trial date by several months. 
But Harry did grant the NFL’s motion to exclude testimony about 
alleged conversations between then-Commissioner Pete Rozelle and 
Rams owner Georgia Frontiere about a supposed scheme to scalp tickets 
to Super Bowl XIV at the Coliseum in 1980.56  Lynch called it “one small 
step” for the league, but one that would not make it less “impossible to 
find an unbiased and indifferent jury.”57 
During opening statements, Max Blecher, the Coliseum Commis-
sion’s colorful lawyer, made it clear that the big-time business of profes-
sional football would be on trial—that “nothing less than the American 
free enterprise system” was at stake.58  “When we lost the Rams [to An-
aheim], we didn’t cry,” he said.  “We did the redblooded American thing.  
We went out and got ourselves a team.  But they [the NFL] won’t let us 
have it.”59  And he scoffed at the idea that the NFL was a single entity: 
“They call themselves partners,” Blecher said, “and that is simply 
ridiculous.” As partners, why don’t they share their profits? Sure, 
they share television revenues, but what about the rest of their prof-
its? “Not only don’t the teams share their wealth, they refuse to even 
tell each other how much money they make each season. And you 
call that a partnership?”60 
Patrick Lynch, the NFL’s attorney, countered that the league was a 
single organization that would “dissolve into chaos” if its rules could be 
flouted by a single team like the Raiders.61  Relying on cartoon drawings, 
he compared the league’s product—NFL football—to artisan pottery, 
and the twenty-eight member clubs to the potter, the seller, and the other 
men required to bring the pottery to market.62  “These are the agreements 
between the men to market the product,” he told jurors.  “They are work-
ing together to sell the product and they are working as a single unit.  
 
 56. Sports News, UNITED PRESS INT’L, May 1, 1981, LEXIS Job No. 126342115. 
 57. Id. 
 58. John F. Berry, Big-Business Football in Dock as Raider-NFL Trial Opens; Raider-
NFL Trial Starts in L.A., WASH. POST, May 19, 1981, at D1, LEXIS Job No. 126284280. 
 59. Id. 
 60. Rich Tosches, Opening Arguments Begin in Raiders Trial, UNITED PRESS INT’L, 
May 20, 1981, at 1-2, LEXIS Job No. 126284450. 
 61. Id. 
 62. Id. 
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That’s what the NFL is.  All twenty-eight teams in agreement to produce 
a certain product.”63 
The first two live witnesses were Pete Rozelle, the league’s long-
time commissioner, and Eugene Klein, the owner of the San Diego 
Chargers.64  Their testimony didn’t seem to put the league’s best foot 
forward.  A reporter observed that Rozelle’s “legendary smoothness” 
came across as “evasiveness” in questioning by Joe Alioto, the former 
San Francisco mayor, and lawyer for the Raiders.65  And after four hours 
of strenuous testimony, Klein, then sixty, was hospitalized for a heart 
attack, but was later listed in satisfactory condition.66 
And then there was a controversial attempt by Rams’ attorney Jo-
seph Cotchett to impeach Al Davis using excerpts from a magazine arti-
cle in which Davis expressed a childhood admiration for Adolf Hitler.67  
Harry called the excerpt “inflammatory and irrelevant” and ordered the 
jury to disregard it.68 
Two weeks into the trial, Harry asked the parties to present “mini-
arguments” to the jury.69  Instead of waiting until the end of the trial, he 
gave each side an hour and-a-half to summarize what they felt had been 
proved so far.70  Harry had adopted this unusual practice before during 
lengthy and complex trials, because it helped the jury stay focused.71 
A month later, with the trial still in full swing, Davis hosted a party 
for the L.A. press corps in the grand ballroom of the Beverly Hilton Ho-
tel.72  Each guest was greeted at the door by Raiderettes cheerleaders in 
costume and invited to have their photograph taken while positioned be-
tween the club’s two shiny Super Bowl trophies, which were protected 
by uniformed guards.73  The parting gift was a silver and black ruffled 
garter bearing a metal logo of the club.74  A sports writer who got one 
reported, “My wife threw mine out with the eggshells the next morn-
ing.”75 
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 64. Joseph St. Amant, Jury to Hear Mini-Arguments in Antitrust Case, UNITED PRESS 
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 65. Amant, supra note 64, at 1. 
 66. Id. 
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1981, at 1, LEXIS Job No. 126284688. 
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 69. Amant, supra note 64. 
 70. Id. 
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After fifty-five days of testimony and thirteen days of deliberations, 
with the whole process spanning four months, the jury of seven men and 
three women, most of whom had little interest in professional football, 
were unable to reach the required unanimous verdict.76  They dead-
locked: eight votes went to the plaintiffs and two votes went to the de-
fendants.77  It turned out that one of the votes for the defendants, Thomas 
Gelker, had failed to disclose that his cousin, Bruce Gelker, once owned 
the Portland Storm of the long-defunct World Football League.78  Davis 
went so far as to call Gelker a “plant”—an accusation hotly disputed by 
the NFL—but there was little evidence of this, and Gelker was not dis-
qualified.79  Reluctantly, Harry declared a mistrial, and scheduled a new 
trial to start in the fall of 1981.80 
2. Second Liability Trial 
The Second Liability Trial, which lasted from April to May 1982, 
went a lot faster because Harry made the parties focus on the reasona-
bleness of Rule 4.3 and imposed time limits on the testimony of wit-
nesses, but chapter two of the Raiders saga generated plenty of drama of 
its own.   
For example, the NFL filed a motion asking Harry to limit the num-
ber of courtroom reporters in attendance to five.81  “We don’t want the 
jurors to have a phalanx of reporters breathing down their necks as they 
did in the last trial,” Patrick Lynch, the league’s attorney complained.82  
“The way the matter was handled during the first trial was fine,” Harry 
replied.83  He denied the motion.84 
During jury selection, an unidentified woman placed a series of tel-
ephone calls alleging that a prospective juror had discussed the case with 
his family and was concealing a bias against the league.85  The calls were 
 
 76. James J. Doyle, UNITED PRESS INT’L, July 30, 1981, at 1, LEXIS Job No. 
126346118; Joan Goulding, UNITED PRESS INT’L, Aug. 15, 1981, at 1, LEXIS Job No. 
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ASSOCIATED PRESS, Aug. 14, 1981, at 1, LEXIS Job No. 126347918. 
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placed to the chambers of Judge Pregerson, the headquarters of the 
Rams, and the law offices of O’Melveny & Myers, where Lynch was a 
partner.86  “I have a feeling that we’re probably dealing with a crank 
caller and will never get to the bottom of this,” Harry said, and Alioto 
agreed.87  “There are two events that tend to bring out the nuthouse bri-
gade,” he said.  “One is a full moon and the other is a major trial.”88 
Once the jury was picked, Lynch complained that five of the six 
jurors were women.89  “It would have been better to have more of a bal-
ance of men,” he said.90  He also got into a shouting match with Alioto 
over whether the NFL had investigated the backgrounds of the jurors in 
the First Liability Trial.91  Despite the complaints, the trial moved for-
ward. 
In the end, after just twenty-one days of testimony and only five 
and a half hours of deliberations, the jury returned a verdict for the plain-
tiffs in the Second Liability Trial.92  The news made the front page of the 
New York Times.93  “I’m elated,” a victorious Al Davis proclaimed.94  
“I knew it would happen, but it’s no less exciting.  We won it on credi-
bility and the facts,” Davis affirmed.  “For fifteen years we’ve known 
that rule was illegal, and knocking it down like this won’t hurt the NFL 
one bit.  We’ll still be a great league, but now our laws will conform to 
the laws of the United States.”95  Alioto called it a “smashing victory 
over a very tough and worthy opponent.”96  Blecher added that the swift-
ness of the verdict was no surprise.97  “I think the toughest thing the jury 
had to do was pick a foreman,” he said.  “The NFL had no case.  It wasn’t 
even close.”98 
A few weeks later, Harry issued an injunction barring the NFL from 
interfering with the Raiders’ move from Oakland to Los Angeles,99 and 
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the die was cast.  During what would become the strike-shortened 1982-
83 season,100 the club went on to win all four of its home games at the 
Coliseum.101  After cruising to an eight to one record, however, the Raid-
ers lost to the Jets in the second round of the playoffs.102  But the next 
year, during a full-schedule 1983-84 season, the team would win six of 
their eight home games at the Coliseum.103  After compiling a twelve-to-
four record, the team marched through the playoffs and won Super Bowl 
XVIII.104 
3. Damages Trial 
From September 1982 through May 1983, while the appeals of the 
Single-Entity Ruling and injunction were pending, the Damages Trial 
proceeded.105  A huge verdict came back in favor of the plaintiffs: the 
Coliseum Commission was awarded almost $14.6 million in antitrust 
damages (trebled from over $4.8 million); the Raiders were awarded al-
most $34.7 million in antitrust damages (trebled from nearly $11.6 mil-
lion); and the Raiders were awarded another almost $11.6 million in 
damages for breach of the covenant of good faith and fair dealing under 
California state law.106  Later, in 1986, the same Ninth Circuit panel that 
had affirmed the Single-Entity Ruling affirmed the Coliseum Commis-
sion’s award by a unanimous vote, vacated and remanded for recalcula-
tion the Raiders’ award by a two-to-one vote, and reversed the Raiders’ 






 100. Dan Flaherty, 1982 NFL Season, SPORTS NOTEBOOK (Aug. 18, 2016), 
https://www.thesportsnotebook.com/tag/1982-nfl-season/. 
 101. 1982 Los Angeles Raiders Statistics & Players, PRO FOOTBALL REFERENCE, 
https://www.pro-football-reference.com/teams/rai/1982.htm (last visited Oct. 10, 2020). 
 102. Id. 
 103. 1983 Los Angeles Raiders Statistics & Players, PRO FOOTBALL REFERENCE, 
https://www.pro-football-reference.com/teams/rai/1983.htm (last visited Oct. 10, 2020). 
 104. Id. 
 105. L.A. Mem’l. Coliseum Com’n v. NFL, 791 F.2d 1356, 1359 (9th Cir. 1986). 
 106. Id. 
 107. Id. at 1375-76. 
 
2020] THE MORE THINGS STAY THE SAME 297 
III. THE SINGLE-ENTITY RULING 
The Single-Entity Ruling was issued by Harry in his capacity as a 
district judge sitting by designation108—that is, as an overtime gig in ad-
dition to his regular job as a United States circuit judge, for which he 
received not a penny more in salary.  (In 1979, when Harry was elevated 
from the U.S. District Court for the Central District of California to the 
U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit, he had kept and continued 
to manage several big, docket-busting cases, one of which was the Raid-
ers Antitrust Litigation.109)  The Single-Entity Ruling addressed what 
would prove to be the pivotal question of law in the Raiders Antitrust 
Litigation: whether or not the NFL was a single economic entity incapa-
ble of conspiring with itself to violate the antitrust laws.110 
Since 1890, Section 1 of the Sherman Antitrust Act has outlawed 
“[e]very contract, combination . . . or conspiracy, in restraint of trade or 
commerce.”111  Section 1 is meant to enforce the First Commandment of 
antitrust law: the competitive market, not any artificial barrier erected by 
buyers or sellers, should determine the price of goods and services.112  
The Raiders and the Coliseum Commission had sued the NFL and its 
twenty-seven member teams on the theory that Rule 4.3, the league’s 
restrictive franchise relocation rule, was the means by which other fran-
chise owners had engaged in an illegal contract, combination, or con-
spiracy to restrain the trade of offering NFL football to the Los Angeles 
market.113  Under Rule 4.3, the plaintiffs needed to persuade twenty-one 
clubs to approve the move from Oakland to L.A., but they failed to at-
tract a single vote.114  No club owner showed any sign of budging.  To 
win their lawsuit, the Raiders would have to prove that Rule 4.3 should 
be thrown out on the ground that it unreasonably restrained trade.115  But 
first, they had to show that the NFL was really twenty-eight separate 
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entities capable of conspiring with each other rather than a single entity 
incapable of such a feat.116 
In the spring of 1981, as the Second Liability Trial came to a close, 
the parties filed cross-motions for a directed verdict on the question 
whether the NFL must be considered a single entity for purposes of the 
Raiders Antitrust Litigation.117  The NFL and the other clubs, including 
the L.A. Rams, filed briefs asking Harry to adopt the single-entity de-
fense and to take the case away from the jury; the Raiders and the Coli-
seum Commission filed briefs asking him to rule that the twenty-eight 
clubs were separate economic entities and to instruct the jury accord-
ingly.118  Although Harry found the question to be “a close one,” he came 
to be convinced that “the undisputed facts preclude treating the NFL as 
a single entity for purposes of this lawsuit.”119 
Harry began with what the record showed “[o]n its face”: that the 
NFL “certainly appears to be an association of separate business entities 
rather than one single enterprise.”120 
[The clubs] are separate legal entities: some corporations, some part-
nerships, and some sole proprietorships.  No two clubs have a com-
mon owner.  The clubs share a large part, but not all, of their reve-
nues.  They do not share their profits or losses.  They are managed 
independently, each making its own decisions concerning ticket 
prices, player acquisitions and salaries, the hiring of coaches and ad-
ministrators and the terms of their stadium leases.  They do not ex-
change or share their accounting books and records.121 
Citing longstanding precedents by the U.S. Supreme Court122 and 
the Ninth Circuit,123 Harry observed that the single-entity defense had 
been rejected “in circumstances more favorable to that argument than 
those presented in this case.”124  Even a parent company and its subsidi-
ary had been held by the Supreme Court to be separate entities capable 
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of conspiring together to violate the antitrust laws, despite having com-
mon ownership.125 
Next, Harry took on the league’s argument that the unitary or joint 
venture nature of the product it creates—namely, NFL football—neces-
sarily implied that the league was a single entity.  He quoted from the 
NFL’s brief: “[T]he economic substance is that of a single firm selling a 
single product involving a necessary contribution from each member.”126  
According to Harry, this argument suffered from at least three defects. 
First, the NFL’s argument, if accepted, “would prove too much.”127  
If the league would have to be treated as a single entity for purposes of 
litigation attacking its franchise relocation restrictions, simply because 
the member clubs must cooperate in order to produce exhibitions in the 
form of football games, then it also would have to be treated as a single 
entity for purposes of litigation attacking its player acquisition re-
strictions.128  As every student of sports law knows, however, player ac-
quisition restrictions “have repeatedly been found to violate Section 1 
[of the Sherman Antitrust Act].”129  In fact, as early as 1957, the Supreme 
Court had declared the NFL and its member clubs to be subject to the 
federal antitrust laws—and implicitly, capable of conspiring among 
themselves to violate those laws—without regard for the unitary nature 
of the enterprise.130 
Second, organizations other than the NFL, whose product is just as 
unitary in nature, have been found to violate Section 1 of the Sherman 
Antitrust Act.131  The “clearest instance” of this was the case involving 
the Associated Press (AP).132  The AP, an incorporated association 
whose members were and are newspapers, pooled their resources to 
gather and distribute news that no individual paper could manage to do 
single-handedly.133  The Supreme Court had no trouble finding the AP’s 
by-laws, which prevented the competitors of member papers from 
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joining the association, restrained free trade.134  Harry reasoned: “This 
was a product or service distinct from that of the member publishers, and 
one requiring the cooperation of all the members, none of whom had the 
facilities or resources to produce AP’s stream of worldwide news.”135 
Third, the NFL’s argument rested on a “false premise”—namely, 
that the individual clubs “are not separate business entities whose prod-
ucts have an independent value.”136  (He might have added that, even 
within the same league, different franchises fetch different sale prices, 
depending on the good will, history, market, and win-loss record associ-
ated with the franchise.)137  Just because it takes a “cooperative frame-
work” to produce football games “does not show that each club can pro-
duce football games only as an NFL member.”138  Harry explained that 
many NFL clubs, including the Raiders, used to operate as members of 
a rival football league: the old AFL (American Football League).  “There 
is no conceptual reason why any NFL team could not decide to pull out 
and join a new league.”139  Besides, sports fans “quite often wish to spend 
their money on the games of a particular team, not simply on ‘NFL foot-
ball.’ ” 140 
Therefore, Harry concluded, the NFL’s member teams “should be 
treated as separate business enterprises for purposes of this lawsuit.”141  
He agreed with the league that its business structure “presupposes a de-
gree of mutual cooperation perhaps unique to the world of professional 
sports,” but felt that “such unique features” were more relevant to 
“weighing the reasonableness of the restraint at issue in this case—a task 
for the jury—and do not suffice to exempt that restraint from antitrust 
scrutiny altogether by establishing a single entity defense.”142  Accord-
ingly, Harry granted the plaintiff’s motion for a directed verdict rejecting 
the single entity defense and denied the defendants’ motion for a directed 
verdict accepting that defense.143 
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On May 6, 1982, the jury was given instructions consistent with the 
Single-Entity Ruling and sent out to deliberate as to whether Rule 4.3 
was an unreasonable restraint of trade.144 
On May 7, just a day later, the jury returned a verdict in favor of the 
Coliseum Commission and the Raiders.145  It found the NFL and the 
other clubs liable under Section 1 of the Sherman Act.146 
On June 14, Harry entered judgment on the liability issues along 
with a permanent injunction barring the NFL and its other member clubs 
from interfering with the transfer of the Raiders franchise from Oakland 
to Los Angeles.147 
Finally, on July 24, 1981, Harry published his opinion directing a 
verdict in favor of the plaintiffs and laying out his rationale as summa-
rized above.148 
The NFL appealed.149  By a vote of two to one, the U.S. Court of 
Appeals for the Ninth Circuit affirmed the judgment, including the Sin-
gle-Entity Ruling and the permanent injunction barring the league from 
interfering with the club’s move to L.A.150  Writing for the majority, 
Judge J. Blaine Anderson, joined by Judge Dorothy Nelson, endorsed 
Harry’s rationale and declared that it was consistent with decisions by 
the Second,151 Eighth,152 Ninth,153 and D.C. Circuits,154 rejecting the sin-
gle-entity defense in the context of various NFL rules otherwise found 
to violate the antitrust laws, and with decisions by the Supreme Court155 
in analogous contexts.156  Reaching the merits, the Ninth Circuit went on 
to affirm the jury’s finding that Rule 4.3 constituted an unreasonable re-
straint of trade.157 
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Dissenting, Judge Spencer Williams, a district judge from Northern 
California who was sitting by designation,158 would have adopted the 
NFL’s single entity defense.159  To Judge Williams, the “crucial crite-
rion” was whether the league’s “formally distinct member clubs compete 
in any economically meaningful sense in the marketplace.”160  He 
thought not.  Judge Williams criticized Harry’s Single-Entity Ruling for 
“ignoring the subtle, but yet more significant interdependency . . . and 
. . . indivisibility” of the twenty-eight clubs.161  Putting aside the “for-
malistic aspects” of the clubs’ separate organizational and relational sta-
tus,162 he concluded that the “profound interdependency” of the league 
and its member clubs “in the daily operation and strategic marketing of 
professional football” should have carried the day.163 
Shortly thereafter, all appeals of the judgment in the Second Liabil-
ity Trial were exhausted when the Supreme Court denied review.164 
Of course, the Single-Entity Ruling attracted both defenders and 
skeptics.165  Besides Judge Williams, who dissented from the Ninth Cir-
cuit’s affirmance of Harry’s ruling, some scholars have criticized the re-
jection of the single-entity defense by courts in general166 and Harry’s 
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IV. THE IMPACT OF THE SINGLE-ENTITY RULING 
In at least three respects, Harry’s rejection of the single-entity de-
fense has had a tremendous impact on professional team sports in North 
America. 
First, the Single-Entity Ruling has ushered in a new era of franchise 
movement, especially in the NFL.  As noted above, in the forty years 
before the 1980 regular season, the NFL saw only four franchise reloca-
tions from one metropolitan area to another.168  But in the forty years 
after the 1980 regular season, the league saw eleven franchise reloca-
tions.169  These relocations involved the Raiders, who moved from Oak-
land to Los Angeles in 1982; the Colts, who moved from Baltimore to 
Indianapolis in 1984; the Cardinals, who moved from St. Louis to Phoe-
nix in 1987; the Rams, who moved from Anaheim to St. Louis in 1995; 
the Raiders, who moved from Los Angeles back to Oakland in 1995; the 
Ravens, who moved from Cleveland to Baltimore and changed their 
name from the Browns in 1996; the Titans, who actually moved twice: 
from Houston to Memphis in 1997 and then to Nashville in 1998 and 
changed their name from the Oilers; the Rams, who moved from St. 
Louis back to Los Angeles in 2016; the Chargers, who moved from San 
Diego back to Los Angeles in 2017; and the Raiders, who moved from 
Oakland to Las Vegas in 2020.170 
These franchise movements were in response to the demand for 
NFL football in the newer metropolitan markets to which the teams re-
located—and sometimes, demand for the same product in the older met-
ropolitan markets from which those teams had decamped.171  As a result, 
 
 168. Jeff Kerr, Las Vegas Raiders latest NFL franchise to change cities: Here’s a look at 





 169. Erik Spanberg, Expansion and relocation: From new franchises to moves in the 
night, SPORTS BUS. J. (Sept. 2, 2019), https://www.sportsbusinessdaily.com/Journal/Is-
sues/2019/09/02/Teams-and-League/Expansion-and-Relocation.aspx. 
 170. Id. Note: the Patriots in 1971 moved from Boston to Foxboro, Mass. (and changed 
their name to the New England Patriots) but remained in the Boston metropolitan area. Team 
History, PRO FOOTBALL HALL OF FAME, https://www.profootballhof.com/teams/new-eng-
land-patriots/team-history/ (last visited Oct. 5, 2020). 
 171. See, e.g., Emily Caron, When Did the Rams Move to Los Angeles?, SPORTS 
ILLUSTRATED (Jan. 20, 2019), https://www.si.com/nfl/2019/01/20/when-did-rams-move-los-
angeles-franchise-history-locations. 
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the total number of NFL franchises has grown from twenty-eight before 
the Single-Entity Ruling to thirty-two afterward.172 
And the more things stay the same, the more they change: of the 
eleven franchise relocations that have occurred in the past forty years, 
five have involved either the return of the franchise to its former metro-
politan home (the Raiders back to Oakland in 1995, the Rams back to 
Los Angeles in 2016, and the Chargers back to Los Angeles in 2017) or 
the replacement of a franchise that had moved out of its metropolitan 
home (the Raiders replacing the Rams in Los Angeles in 1982 and the 
Rams replacing the Cardinals in St. Louis in 1995).173  Not surprisingly,  
each of these moves affected the largest market for NFL football, Cali-
fornia, which until the Raiders moved to Nevada, was the only state to 
host four teams.174 
Similarly, thanks in part to the Single-Entity Ruling, franchise 
movement restrictions have loosened in other major professional sports.  
For example, the NBA was unable to stop the Clippers from moving 
from San Diego to Los Angeles in 1984, even though they had failed to 
ask for or receive the league’s permission.175 
Second, the Single-Entity Ruling has exposed to antitrust scrutiny 
a variety of anticompetitive practices other than franchise relocation pol-
icy.  For example, in the NFL alone, the courts have rejected the league’s 
repeated attempts to argue that its member clubs were incapable of con-
spiring among themselves in Sherman Act lawsuits challenging the fol-
lowing league policies or practices: 
 
• A proposal to replace individual salary negotiations with a wage 
scale setting the price for all player services.176  In rejecting the 
NFL’s argument, the U.S. District Court for the District of Min-
nesota cited the Ninth Circuit’s affirmance of Harry’s Single-
Entity Ruling.177 
 
• A resolution capping the salaries of development squad players 
at $1,000 per week.178 
 
 172. L.A. Mem’l Coliseum Comm’n v. NFL, 519 F. Supp. 581, 583 (C.D. Cal. 1981); 
NFL Teams by State 2020, WORLD POPULATION REV., https://worldpopulationre-
view.com/states/nfl-teams-by-state/ (last visited Oct. 5, 2020). 
 173. Spanberg, supra note 169. 
 174. NFL Teams by State 2020, supra note 172. 
 175. See NBA v. SDC Basketball Club, Inc., 815 F.2d 562, 563-64 (9th Cir. 1987). 
 176. See McNeil v. NFL, 790 F. Supp. 871, 872, 875-76 (D. Minn. 1992). 
 177. See id. at 878-80 (citing L.A. Mem’l Coliseum Comm’n v. NFL, 726 F.2d 1381, 
1389 (9th Cir. 1984)). 
 178. See Brown v. Pro Football, Inc., No. CIV. A. 90-1071(REL), 1992 WL 88039 
(D.D.C. Mar. 10, 1992), rev’d, 50 F.3d 1041 (D.C. Cir. 1995), aff’d, 518 U.S. 231 (1996). 
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• A rule prohibiting cross-ownership of soccer and other profes-
sional sports franchises by the owners of NFL franchises.179 
 
• A rule favoring closely-held club ownership, and forbidding the 
sale of club shares to the public.180  In rejecting the NFL’s argu-
ment, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the First Circuit cited the 
Ninth Circuit’s affirmance of Harry’s Single-Entity Ruling.181 
 
Harry’s ultimate vindication came almost thirty years later, in 
American Needle, Inc. v. National Football League, 182 in which the Su-
preme Court rejected the NFL’s argument that it was immune from an-
titrust scrutiny insofar as the league, its franchises, and a separate entity 
they had created that was  engaged in the business of marketing the 
clubs’ intellectual property with apparel manufacturers.183  Without cit-
ing the Single-Entity Ruling by name, the Court nevertheless embraced 
Harry’s reasoning and result, and did so unanimously.184 
Third, the Single-Entity ruling has helped spawn new forms of 
sports ownership that were designed, among other things, to evade anti-
trust scrutiny by looking more like genuine parts of a single business 
entity. 
For example, the investor-operators of Major League Soccer (MLS) 
are all financially invested in the same business entity: Major League 
Soccer, LLC; no traditional franchise owners are permitted.185  As a re-
sult, they succeed or fail together.  In exchange for an investment in the 
LLC, each investor-operator is entitled to operate one of the teams, re-
ceive a pro-rata share of the overall profits or losses, and share certain 
group revenues, such as television broadcast rights, league sponsorships, 
and online sales.186  In effect, part of each club is owned by the league 
and, therefore, each of the other clubs.  But each investor-operator gets to 
keep most local revenues, such as local broadcast rights, area 
 
 179. See N. Am. Soccer League v. NFL, 670 F.2d 1249, 1249-50 (2d Cir. 1982). 
 180. See Sullivan v. NFL, 34 F.3d 1091 (1st Cir. 1994). 
 181. See id. at 1099-1100 (1st Cir. 1994) (citing L.A. Mem’l Coliseum Comm’n v. NFL, 
726 F.2d 1381, 1387-90 (9th Cir. 1984)). 
 182. See Am. Needle, Inc. v. NFL, 560 U.S. 183 (2010). 
 183. Am. Needle, 560 U.S. at 199-200. 
 184. See id. at 185, 199-200. 
 185. Peter Galindo, MLS’ Single-Entity Structure Is the League’s Biggest Obstacle, 
BLEACHER REP. (Jan. 24, 2015), https://bleacherreport.com/articles/2339627-mls-single-en-
tity-structure-is-the-biggest-obstacle-for-the-league. 
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sponsorships, concessions and merchandise sold in the stadium, as well 
as parking fees.187 
If the NFL had been organized as the MLS actually is, then the 
league might have prevailed in Harry’s Single-Entity Ruling.188  In the 
case of professional team soccer, Harry’s influence has been to encourage 
innovation in the structure of sports business ownership. 
V. CONCLUSION 
For a guy who thought sports were fun and liked to say, “Fun is 
bullshit,” Harry Pregerson has had a significant impact on the applica-
tion of antitrust law to major league team sports.  His Single-Entity Rul-
ing is likely to influence legal challenges to the franchise movement pol-
icy in the NFL and beyond for years to come. 
 
 187. See Isaac Krasny, Unpacking the Major League Soccer Business Model, MEDIUM 
(June 7, 2017), https://medium.com/@isaac_krasny/unpacking-the-major-league-soccer-
business-model-827f4b784bcd. 
 188. See, e.g., Fraser v. Major League Soccer, L.L.C., 284 F.3d 47, 58-59 (1st Cir. 2002) 
(considering “hybrid” nature of MLS business structure but concluding that single-entity de-
fense “need not be answered definitively” in case at bar). 
